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Abstract: A credit default swap (CDS) enables a lender to hedge its risk exposure on a loan
given to reference client. The lender then reduces the monitoring of the client’s activities as well
as aiding the distressed client. Two contrasting predictions can be made about how the borrower
would respond to the altered lender-borrower relationship. (1) The borrower reduces risky
investments to lower its vulnerability to financial distress. (2) The borrower pursues volatilityenhancing projects to increase the value of call options built into its shareholder investments. We
find that a borrower shifts to a more conservative policy when its managers have low portfolio
sensitivity to stock volatility (vega). A borrower with high managerial vega, however, seeks
volatility-enhancing projects. Shareholders then increase vega incentives for managers to
maintain investments in risky, positive NPV projects at pre CDS levels. This action, however,
also results in higher bankruptcy risk. Our study shows a unique interaction between the
manager-shareholder and lender-shareholder conflicts arising from CDS inception, which alters
the course of the borrower’s operating policy.
JEL classification: G32, G33; M41; M48
Keywords: Credit default swap (CDS); Agency conflict; Managerial compensation; Operating
risks; Investment policy; Asset substitution; Bankruptcy
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1. Introduction
The lender-borrower relationship changes significantly at credit default swap (CDS)
inception; that is, when a lender obtains insurance on a loan given to a client via a CDS. The
“empty” lender continues to possess all of the legal rights attached to the loan but has little skin
left in the game (Hu and Black, 2008; Bolton and Oehmke, 2011). It could refuse debt workouts
to the client, who initially borrowed money expecting renegotiation and accommodation in
future, tough times (Roberts and Sufi, 2009; Danis, 2016). The increased lender intransigence
makes the borrower more vulnerable to bankruptcy (Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang, 2014).
The lender also reduces the vigilance of the borrower’s activities (Martin and Roychowdhury,
2015; Amiram, Beaver, Landsman, and Zhao, 2016). In this study, we examine how the
borrower changes its investment activities in response to the altered dynamics of the lenderborrower relationship post–CDS inception.1
Upon observing the lender’s increased intransigence but reduced monitoring, the
borrower can change its investment policies in two contrasting ways. On one hand, it could
lower its risky investments because of the lender’s more credible threat of foreclosure (Arping,
2014; Augustin, Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang, 2014). On the other hand, upon observing the
lender’s weakened vigilance and monitoring, the borrower could enhance asset volatility to
increase the value of call options built into its shareholder investments (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). We do not find economically significant changes in investment policies post–CDS
inception. Yet, we observe nuanced patterns after considering the interaction between managershareholder and lender-shareholder conflicts arising from CDS inception. The ex post changes in

Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms react upon observing the onset of CDS trading. See “Too big to ignore:
Debt derivatives markets are encroaching on corporate finance decisions” in CFO Magazine, available at
http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/9821507.
1

1
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firms’ operating policies differ based on the convexity in managerial compensation (vega), a
factor that motivates managers to enhance asset volatility consistent with shareholder interests
but contrary to lender interests (e.g., Smith and Stulz, 1985; Guay, 1999). Managers with low
vega shift to safer investments, nullifying the impact of lender intransigence on bankruptcy risk.
Managers with high vega, however, maintain or even enhance risky investments, worsening the
heightened bankruptcy risk. We contribute to the literature by showing divergent shifts in
borrowers’ investment policies depending on the interplay of rival lender, borrower, and
shareholder forces post–CDS inception.
The literature provides ex ante opposite predictions about how CDS inception would
affect borrower’s risk-taking behavior. A theoretical framework by Arping (2014) predicts that
lenders would pursue a more conservative operating policy. Having hedged its credit exposure
upon CDS inception, an empty lender would not derive the same benefits from the borrower’s
continuing existence as before. The empty lender might not provide additional loans and refuse
out-of-court restructurings when the borrower faces financial distress, thus causing the
borrower’s suboptimal termination. A lender might even encourage foreclosure when the
expected insurance proceeds exceed the amount it can gain from the borrower’s restructuring
(Pollack, 2013; Subrahmanyam et al., 2014). Consistent with these predictions, Subrahmanyam
et al. (2014) find increases in the frequency of borrower bankruptcy post–CDS inception. Faced
with a more credible threat of foreclosure, the borrower could initiate actions to lower its
vulnerability to financial distress, such as by increasing precautionary cash holdings
(Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang, 2017). The literature thus predicts that the borrower would
reduce investments that may yield large returns yet increase the likelihood of firm failure (risky
investments).
2
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A theoretical framework by Jensen and Mecking (1976) on asset substitution provides an
opposite prediction. Shareholders prefer to substitute safe assets with more volatile ones. They
have a call option built into their investment, because they capture all of the upside in the firm
value beyond the face value of debt but have no obligation to meet the deficit when the firm
value falls below the money owed to lenders. Asset volatility thus increases the value of equity,
even if it leaves the expected value of future cash flow unchanged. Increased volatility, however,
adversely impacts the value for lenders by increasing their downside risk. Lenders thus strive to
constrain the borrower’s risk-seeking behavior through active monitoring and covenants (Fama
and Miller, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and Warner, 1979; Rajan and Winton,
1995).
However, monitoring and covenant enforcement require costly efforts (Holmstrom and
Tirole, 1997; Sufi, 2007; Arentsen, Mauer, Rosenlund, Zhang, and Zhao, 2015). Having hedged
its credit exposure upon CDS inception, the empty lender would not derive the same benefit from
monitoring as before (Morrison, 2005; Arentsen et al., 2015). At the margin, the lender can start
shirking its monitoring responsibility and could impose lesser discipline upon a borrower in the
event of a covenant violation (Chakraborty, Chava, and Ganduri, 2015). 2 A borrower would
detect the weakening of the lender’s vigilance (Martin and Roychowdhury, 2015). It can then
take actions that improve shareholder wealth, such as pursuing risky innovation (Chang, Chen,
Wang, Zhang, and Zhang, 2017), which were previously constrained by lender monitoring. Thus,
the asset substitution problem could worsen post–CDS inception.

In addition, the lender’s asset is now assigned the risk of the CDS guarantor instead of that of the borrower (Basel
II, page 49, Article 141). The resultant change of the counterparty risk from borrower to CDS writer reduces the
lender’s regulatory capital requirement, allowing it to expand its loan portfolio (Shan, Tang, and Yan, 2014). Such a
portfolio expansion further dilutes the lender’s monitoring effort per client.
2

3
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Given the two ex-ante competing predictions, an empirical question remains whether the
borrower pursues more conservative or more risky operating investment policies after the onset
of CDS trading. We investigate the changes in corporate investments of 546 firms whose CDSs
started trading during the period 1992 to 2014. We consider mergers and acquisitions (M&As)
and research and development (R&D) activities as proxies for risky investments, relative to
capital expenditures (CAPEX). The motivation comes from studies which find that M&As and
R&D are associated with higher risks than are capital investments (Berkovitch and Kim, 1990;
Kothari, Laguerre, and Leone, 2002; Shi, 2003; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Acharya and
Subramanian, 2009; Acharya, Amihud, and Litov, 2011). 3 In addition, we consider outlays
reported in selling, general, and administrative expenses (SG&A) to be volatility enhancing,
relative to cost of goods sold (COGS). Prior studies show that SG&A enhances operating
leverage, which, in turn, causes asset volatility (Schwert and Strebulaev, 2014; Choi and
Richardson, 2016; Enache and Srivastava, 2017). We find a reduction, or no significant change,
in the risky investment policy after CDS inception depending on the proxy we employ. We find
no shift toward riskier policies or support for the asset substitution idea, on average.
Our competing predictions, based on lenders-shareholder conflict, do not include all
forces that affect the corporate investment policy. Our predictions ignore the utility function of
managers, a key stakeholder in modern corporations characterized by separation of ownership
and control rights (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Harris and Raviv, 1991). In such
organizations, the confluence of the triad of lender, shareholder, and managerial interests
determines the borrower’s investment policy.
3

Relative to investments in tangible assets, corporate innovation is a highly risky and multi-stage endeavor with
unpredictable returns (Holmstrom, 1989). For creditors, the risks of R&D dominates their benefits (Shi 2003).”
While no direct evidence exists of debt covenants constraining R&D expenditures, studies show that strong creditor
rights are associated with reduced R&D spending (Acharya et al., 2011; Seifert and Gonenc, 2012).

4
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The literature provides strong theoretical and empirical guidance that managerial
incentives shape corporate investment policy (e.g., Coles et al., 2006; Armstrong and Vashishtha,
2012). Risk-averse managers’ interests could align with as well as deviate from those of riskneutral shareholders, depending on managers’ incentives. Unlike shareholders who diversify
their risk by holding a range of equities, managers, with their wealth being concentrated in their
own firms, shun firm-specific risks and asset volatility (Coles et al., 2006). The volatility of firm
assets generates upside potential but also downside risk, including default on debt obligations.
Such adverse events impose a range of costs on managers, such as the likelihood of forced
termination, the loss of labor market capital, and the devaluation of firm-specific investments,
that diversified shareholders do not face (Eckbo, Thorburn, and Wang, 2016). Managers thus
lose more than diversified shareholders with the adverse outcomes of asset volatility. With
respect to pursuing volatility enhancing projects, thus, managers’ interests align with those of
lenders but differ from shareholders.
Shareholders reduce conflicts with managers and encourage them to pursue risky but
positive net present value (NPV) projects by giving them stock options. The sensitivity of stock
options’ payoff to stock return volatility, or vega, motivates managers to enhance asset volatility,
consistent with the call option feature built into shareholders’ equity investments (Smith and
Stulz, 1985; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). As a result, vega is associated positively with risky
investments and volatilities of stock price and operating profits (Guay, 1999; Core and Guay,
2002; Coles et al., 2006; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012).4 High
vega managers may hence consider the reduced lender vigilance post–CDS inception as an

4

Other components of managerial compensation could make managers more risk averse by magnifying their
exposure to firm risk (John and John, 1993; Knopf, Nam, and Thornton, 2002). We control for total compensation in
all our tests.

5
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opportunity to enhance asset volatility and increase their vega payoffs. Vega, on one hand,
makes managers act consistent with shareholder interests, on the other hand, makes managers act
contrary to lender interests, causing higher risk premiums and shorter term structures of debt
(Daniel, Martin, and Naveen, 2004; Brockman, Martin, and Unlu, 2010).
We find that managerial vega plays a pivotal role in investment policy becoming more
conservative or more aggressive post–CDS inception. Using all three proxies of risky
investments, we find that firms with low vega managers pursue less risky investments after the
onset of CDS trading. Those firms decrease R&D relative to CAPEX, decrease SG&A relative to
COGS, and conduct less frequent mergers and acquisitions post–CDS inception. Thus, the
prediction of Arping (2014) on firms’ post–CDS behavior holds most strongly for managers who
have little to gain from increased asset volatility but stand most to lose from resulting financial
distress. Furthermore, low vega firms do not experience any increase in bankruptcy likelihood
post–CDS inception, indicating that their managers counterbalance the vulnerability created by
enhanced lender inflexibility by reducing operating risks.5
In contrast, the greater the managerial vega, the higher the increase in R&D and SG&A
outlays and the more frequent the mergers and acquisitions and bankruptcies post–CDS inception.
High vega managers enhance risky investment or they do not reduce them enough to
counterbalance the increased lenders’ intransigence, intensifying the bankruptcy risk. Thus, we
show that the finding of Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), of increase in bankruptcy risk post–CDS
inception, holds only special cases of high vega firms.

5

Our findings are similar to Low (2009), who shows that an exogenous shock, because of a new regulation on
takeover provisions, causes firms to reduce risky investments. However, this shift is concentrated among firms with
low managerial vega.

6
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If the previous levels of risky projects with positive net present value were optimal for
shareholders, then low vega managers would deviate from optimal levels post–CDS inception
fearing increased foreclosure risk. CDS inception, thus, could increase manager-shareholder
conflicts. Shareholders could minimize these deviations by altering the managerial compensation
structure. We find, consistent with this proposition, an approximately 20% increase in
managerial vega post–CDS inception.6
Even though a third party initiates CDS trading, CDS inception is not a random event,
and it is determined by supply of and demand for CDS contracts to speculate on or hedge a
reference firm’s credit risk. Omitted factors affecting demand or supply can also affect firm’s
investment and compensation policy. We address this potential endogeneity problem (Ashcraft
and Santos, 2009) by conducting all our tests using a difference-in-differences approach before
and after CDS inception relative to propensity score matched non-CDS firms. [Subrahmanyam et
al. (2014) and Martin and Roychowdhury (2015) use the same approach.] In addition, we use a
three-stage least squares method (3SLS) to address the joint determination of vega, CDS
inception, and investment policy and to address the concern of omitted correlated variables (e.g.,
Zellner and Theil, 1962; Martin and Roychowdhury, 2015). To strengthen our identification
strategy with respect to reduced lender monitoring, we identify banks that are likely to have
hedged their exposure upon CDS inception (Minton, Stulz, and Williamson, 2009;
Subrahmanyam et al., 2014). Our results either are stronger or hold only for the subsample of
borrowers associated with such lenders.
Our paper is related to a contemporaneous working paper (Bartram, Conrad, Lee, and
Subrahmanyam, 2017) that finds a decrease in risky investments post–CDS inception in an
6

In a work subsequent to ours, Lee, Oh, and Yermack (2017) analytically establish reasons for expecting increase in
vega after the onset of CDS trading.

7
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examination of varying creditor rights across countries. Our paper is also associated with Chang
et al. (2017), who find an increase in innovation output post–CDS inception. Neither paper
considers managers’ incentives. Our study reconciles the seemingly opposite results of these two
papers by emphasizing the critical role of managers’ incentives in post–CDS investment policy
changes.
Overall, we make two contributions to the literature. First, we show nuanced patterns of
changes in borrowers’ investment policy, following CDS inception, depending on the managerial
incentives. Low vega managers pursue more conservative policies post–CDS inception. These
changes negate the effect of increased lender intransigence on corporate bankruptcy risk. High
vega managers behave in an opposite manner, worsening the heightened bankruptcy risk.
Shareholders, nevertheless, increase managerial vega to motivate managers to maintain risky,
positive NPV projects post–CDS inception. Our study, therefore, presents a fuller picture of
shifts in rival lender, shareholder, and managerial forces that shape borrower’s investment
policies post–CDS inception, than has been considered in prior literature. Ours is a unique study
examining the interaction between manager-shareholder and lender-shareholder conflicts arising
from CDS inception. As such, we respond to the Stulz (2010) and Augustin et al. (2014) call for
a thorough examination of corporate policy changes upon CDS inception. Second, we stipulate
high managerial vega as an additional condition, and risky operating investments as an addition
factor, for the increased bankruptcy risk following CDS inception.
2. Literature review and motivation of hypothesis.
The creation of CDS contracts is credited to J.P. Morgan, which sold the credit risk of
Exxon Corporation in 1994 (Tett, 2009). Initially, CDS contracts were used to hedge the credit
risk of bank loans. After the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)
8
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standardized CDS contracts, other participants such as hedge funds and asset managers entered
the CDS market. The notional amount of outstanding CDS contracts peaked at $62.2 trillion by
the end of 2007. After the financial crisis of 2008–2009, the notional amount declined, but it
remains at the double-digit trillion-dollar level (ISDA 2013).
Third parties initiate CDS trades, which offers the lender an opportunity to change its
counterparty risk to one based on a more creditworthy CDS writer. Because CDSs can be written
on any credit event, such as a default of interest or principal payment or a violation of a debt
covenant, a lender can buy at least some insurance on its credit risk even if the CDS is not
written on its original asset. Buying credit risk protection and transferring risk to a more
creditworthy party, partially or fully, separates the creditor’s control rights from its cash flow
rights (Hu and Black, 2008; Bolton and Oehmke, 2011). Whether and how the altered debtorcreditor relation affects the borrower’s corporate investment policies remains largely
unexamined, in spite of prior research documenting a range of economic consequences of CDS
contracts.7
We formulate ex ante two opposing predictions on whether the borrower would pursue a
more risky or more conservative operating investment policy upon CDS inception. Both
predictions come from the empty lender argument. First, an empty lender would have a reduced
interest in the continuation of the debtor, would be less flexible in negotiations upon any credit
event, would be less willing to provide additional loans to the borrower to ride out its temporary
liquidity problems, and could push the borrower into inefficient bankruptcy or liquidation.
Bartram et al. (2017) examine the joint impact of creditor rights and CDS trades on a country’s financing and
investment policies. Our paper differs from theirs because they investigate the effects of variations in creditor rights.
They create a unique set of covariates to control for factors that determine corporate investment policy, arguably
because of lack of data on foreign companies (see their Table 6). Data availability might also constrain them from
addressing the endogeneity issues related to CDS inception, a universal feature of published papers examining the
consequences of CDS inception.
7
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Consistent with this idea, Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) find increases in bankruptcy risk after
CDS trade inception. Faced with a more credible threat of foreclosure, the borrower would avoid
actions that increase the likelihood of a credit event. It might reduce investments that have higher
potential payoffs but also a higher likelihood of failure, relative to investments that provide more
predictable returns. Additional motivation for this idea comes from Li and Tang (2016) and
Subrahmanyam et al. (2017), who find that borrowers and their supply chain partners pursue
more conservative cash holding and financing policies, respectively, post–CDS inception.
Second, lenders continue to bear monitoring responsibilities but do not retain the same
incentives to ensure a timely repayment of loans. An empty lender is then less likely to
continuously monitor clients’ activities to protect the value of its claim (Morrison, 2005;
Ashcraft and Santos, 2009; Subrahmanyam et al., 2014; Martin and Roychowdhury, 2015). Thus,
the lender can reduce its costly monitoring and vigilance efforts with respect to the original
borrower because these efforts provide no additional returns.8 Furthermore, such efforts would
be spread over a larger number of clients. This is because the change of the counterparty risk
from borrower to CDS writer reduces the lender’s regulatory capital requirement, allowing it to
expand its loan portfolio (Shan, Tang, and Yan, 2014). The diluted vigilance on the part of the
lender likely permits the original client to increase the operating activities that benefit other
claim holders in the company but were previously constrained by lenders (Campello and Matta,
2012). For example, if rival lender and shareholder forces determine the corporate investment
policies, then equilibrium would shift toward shareholder interests.

8

Similar concerns arise when the lender subsequently sells (securitizes) the loan, but, then, the buyer of the loan
assumes the monitoring responsibilities. Agency conflicts arguably are stronger in the presence of CDSs because
banks obtain protection against their risk exposure without transferring control rights (Parlour and Winton, 2013).

10
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In general, the value of residual claim holders can be viewed as a European call option on
the firm’s assets with the face value of debt being the strike price. Shareholders keep all of the
upside in firm value beyond the face value of debt but, given their limited liability, do not have
to compensate lenders when the firm value declines below the face value of debt. Hence, asset
volatility improves the value of equity, even if it leaves the expected value of the firm’s future
cash flow unchanged. Shareholders thus have a strong incentive to increase asset volatility.
Meanwhile, asset volatility adversely impacts the value for creditors. For example,
creditors suffer large losses when the firm fails. Lenders, which stand to lose when a firm shifts
from safe to risky assets, attempt to prevent such action through covenants and active monitoring
(Fama and Miller, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and Warner, 1979). Any decline in
lender monitoring could shift the equilibrium from lender-shareholder forces toward shareholder
preference, that is, toward higher asset volatility (Campello and Matta, 2012). Thus, the asset
substitution argument implies that shareholders would shift toward riskier investment policies
upon CDS inception, all else held equal. Consistent with this idea, Chang et al. (2017) find
increase in corporate innovation post CDS inception.
We test these competing predictions concerning shifts in borrowers’ investment policy
post–CDS inception, in H1, stated as a null hypothesis.
H1. Borrowers do not change the nature of their operating investments upon CDS
inception.
Discussion to motivate H1, which is based on the shareholder-lender relationship, ignores
the interests of managers, a key stakeholder in modern corporations. The literature provides
strong theoretical and empirical guidance that managers’ incentives and executive compensation
structure shape corporate investment policies. Managers directly control firms’ daily operations.
11
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Their interests with respect to investment policies could align with as well as differ from those of
shareholders and lenders, depending on their compensation structures (Jensen and Mecking,
1976; Harris and Raviv, 1991).
Unlike for shareholders, who can easily diversify their firm-specific risks, managers’
monetary capital and human capital are disproportionately invested in their firms (Aggarwal and
Samwick, 1999). Managers can neither sell their stock options nor easily hedge the risks of
decline in their stock and options’ in-the-money values related to fluctuations in their own firms’
stock prices.9 Therefore, unlike for diversified investors, whose estimated option value increases
with volatility, managers’ utility from holding stock and in-the-money options can decline with
stock price volatility (Pratt, 1964; Arrow, 1965; Carpenter, 2000). Managers holding a large
amount of firm stock and in-the-money stock options can become highly risk averse (Lambert,
Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Furthermore, a credit default
event or a corporate failure more adversely impacts managers than diversified shareholders and
increases the likelihood of forced termination, the loss of labor market capital, and the
devaluation of firm-specific investments (Eckbo et al., 2016). Therefore, managers would not
increase firm risks post–CDS inception even when the equilibrium from rival lender-shareholder
forces shifts in a manner permitting enhanced volatility.
At times, managers’ interests could align with the volatility-enhancing interests of
shareholders depending on their compensation incentives. When managers hold compensation
packages with convex payoffs, that is, when their wealth increases with asset volatility sufficient
enough to make up for their nondiversifiability of firm risks, they might increase firm risks.

9

Managers are not permitted to take short positions in firm securities against their option holdings [Section 16(c) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934]. See Bettis, Bizjak, and Kalpathy (2015) for avenues available to
managers for hedging their risks.

12
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Numerous studies provide evidence for this proposition. Guay (1999) shows that stock return
volatility is positively related to managerial vega. Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) find that
executive stock options induce oil and gas firm managers to invest in risky projects. Coles et al.
(2006) conclude that firms with high managerial vega implement riskier policy choices,
including higher investment in R&D and lower investment in capital expenditure. The
proposition is also supported by studies that examine firms with low or even negative vega. Low
(2009) finds that an exogenous increase in takeover protection in Delaware during the mid-1990s
lowers firms’ risky initiatives. However, this risk reduction is concentrated among firms with
low managerial vega. Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart (2012) show that managers with large
inside debt holdings (indicative of negative vega) prefer less risky investment policies.
Therefore, changes in firms’ investment policies post–CDS inception should be related to
managerial vega. We state H2.
H2. Increase (decrease) in risky investments upon CDS inception occurs to a greater
(lesser) extent for managers with high vega.
Increases in operating risks post–CDS inception, to the extent facilitated by managers’
vega incentives, should increase bankruptcy risk by enhancing the likelihood of both large payoff
and drastic failure. We thus propose an additional explanation for the increases in bankruptcy
risk post–CDS inception.
H3. Increases in bankruptcy risk after CDS trade inception are positively associated with
managers’ vega.

13
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3. Sample selection and descriptive statistics
In this section, we describe the selection of sample and control firms and discuss their
key statistics.
3.1. Selection of CDS firms
We collect data from the Markit database, which covers CDS quotes of U.S. firms
starting in 2001. Markit verifies its CDS data through a multistage scrubbing procedure that
includes evaluating the legal relation between a reference entity and a reference obligation as
well as corporate actions, CDS succession events, and credit events. We gather data on chief
executive officer (CEO) compensation from Standard & Poor’s (S&P) ExecuComp database.
ExecuComp provides current and historical information on executive stock and option awards,
pension plans, and executive compensation, and it covers the top five executive officers of more
than 3,300 companies from 1992 onward. We collect financial and stock price data from
Compustat North America and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), respectively.
We merge the Markit data with information from ExecuComp, Compustat North America, and
CRSP using the ticker, and by manually cross-validating the match between these data sets based
on company names. We identify 546 U.S. firms that initiated trading on single-name CDS
contracts during the sample period from 1992 to 2014.
3.2. Selection of control firms
The onset of CDS trading is arguably not an exogenous occurrence. For example, factors
such as firms’ credit risk and growth opportunities that affect the demand for and the supply of
CDS contracts (Ashcraft and Santos, 2009) could also affect managerial compensation. We
follow the extant literature to address this potential endogeneity issue. We employ a propensity
score matching approach (Ashcraft and Santos, 2009; Martin and Roychowdhury, 2015), which
14
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identifies pairs of treatment and control firms based on similarity of observable firm
characteristics (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). We implement this procedure by first estimating a
logit regression to model the probability of initiating CDS trading, using the samples of both
treatment and control firms. We estimate the following logistic model to predict the onset of
CDS trading:
Prob(CDS_FIRMi,t=1) = α + β1INV_GRADEi,t−1 + β2CREDIT_RATEi,t−1 + β3LEVi,t−1
+ β4PROFITMARGINi,t−1 + β5SIZEi,t−1 + β6STRETVOLi,t−1
+ β7MTBi,t−1 + ε,

(1)

where CDS_FIRM is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has a CDS contract traded
anytime during our study period and zero otherwise. Firms’ credit risk is proxied by
INV_GRADE, CREDIT_RATE, LEV, and PROFITMARGIN. INV_GRADE is an indicator
variable equal to one if a firm has an S&P credit rating above BB+ and zero otherwise.
CREDIT_RATE is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if a firm has an S&P credit
rating and zero otherwise. LEV is leverage, computed as the firm’s total debt divided by total
assets. PROFITMARGIN is net income divided by sales. We also include firm size (SIZE), return
volatility (STRETVOL), and market-to-book ratio (MTB) to account for the effects of the overall
information environment and growth opportunities on the demand and supply of CDS contracts.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of market value of equity. STRETVOL is the standard deviation of
monthly stock return within a fiscal year. MTB is the ratio of market value to book value of
equity. The measurement of all variables is described in Appendix A. The sample period spans
1992 to 2014, and it includes firms with and without traded CDSs during this time, which are
covered by Compustat North America. For firms with CDS contracts, only one year’s
observation, prior to the onset of CDS trading, is included in the sample.
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Panel A of Appendix B reports the estimation results of the logit model in equation (1).
Consistent with prior literature (Martin and Roychowdhury, 2015), the model reasonably
predicts the onset of CDS trading. The proportion of concordant pairs is over 90%, and the
proportion of discordant pair is under 10%. Firms that are larger, have higher credit ratings, and
have lower stock return volatility are more likely to experience CDS trading. Consistent with
Martin and Roychowdhury (2015), these findings indicate an adverse selection view that, in
general, banks (potential protection buyers) have superior private information about the debt
instruments they originate. Consequently, sellers offer CDS contracts mainly on firms that are
relatively less risky and have more transparent information environments.
Having estimated parameters in equation (1), we then estimate the propensity scores for
all non-CDS firms using the predicted parameters from the logit model. We match each CDS
firm to a non-CDS firm by year and the Campbell (1996) industry classification using the nearest
neighbor matching score. We use matching with replacement.10 Hence, the number of control
firms is lower than treatment firms. 11 Panel B of Appendix B provides the standardized
differences in the key variables between CDS firms and non-CDS firms. The results show that
the procedure is effective in removing most of the differences between the two samples except
for a few variables.

Compared with matching without replacement, matching with replacement decreases bias and circumvents the
potential problem that the results are subject to the order in which the treatment units are matched (Dehejia and
Wahba, 2002). Dehejia and Wahba (2002, p. 154) contend that “[w]hen the treatment and comparison units are very
different, finding a satisfactory match by matching without replacement can be very problematic. In particular, if
there are only a handful of comparison units comparable to the treated units, then once these comparison units have
been matched, the remaining treated units will have to be matched to comparison units that are very different. In
such settings, matching with replacement is the natural choice.”
11
Reduction in the sample size for non-CDS firms is caused by performing propensity matching with replacement
such that one control firm could be matched to multiple treatment firms, missing values in the control variables, and
cessation of Compustat coverage due to various reasons, including bankruptcy and mergers and acquisitions by
other firms.
10
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3.3. Proxies for risky investments
We use three proxies for risky operating investments, that is, outlays that enhance asset
volatility. The first proxy is R&D investments whose changes post–CDS inception are
benchmarked against those of CAPEX, consistent with Coles et al. (2006). The motivation for
this measure comes from Kothari et al. (2002), who show that future earnings variability is
higher for R&D-intensive firms than CAPEX. They conclude that R&D investments generate
future benefits that are far more uncertain than those of CAPEX. Supporting this idea, Shi (2003,
p. 227) concludes that, “for creditors, the R&D risk dominates their benefits.” Also, Acharya et
al. (2011) show that strong creditor rights are associated with reduced R&D spending. For our
empirical tests, we benchmark changes in R&D expenditures against those of capital
expenditures. Our test variables, R&D and CAPEX, are divided by assets at the end of the fiscal
year. R&D is set to zero when the value is missing from Compustat.
The second proxy for risky operating investments is SG&A outlays. This proxy is
motivated by Choi and Richardson (2016), who show that operating leverage (SG&A to
operating costs ratio) causes asset volatility. Also, Enache and Srivastava (2017) find that SG&A
enhances the volatility of future profits. We benchmark changes in SG&A expenses against those
of COGS, the other major component of operating costs. We scale both by operating expense to
obtain SG&A and COGS.
The third proxy for risky operating investments is the frequency of M&A transactions,
consistent with Bliss and Rosen (2001), Minnick, Unal, and Yang (2010), and Hagendorff and
Vallascas (2011). Harford and Li (2007) argue that acquisition decisions may be the most
important corporate resource allocation decisions that CEOs take. Yet, acquisition projects have
highly uncertain NPV and alter acquiring firm’s risk profile (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman,
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2001).
In addition to these three proxies of risky operating investments, whose input amounts are
controlled by managers, we investigate an outcome measure of risky investments—the volatility
of the next three years’ operating income (OPINCVOL), consistent with John, Litov, and Yeung
(2008), Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (2011), Acharya, Amihud, and Litov (2011), Kothari et al.
(2002) and Enache and Srivastava (2017). If a ﬁrm undertakes more risky investment projects, its
operating income will increase in some periods when risky investment is translated into financial
success and decrease in other periods when the risky investment is unsuccessful. Since we
include industry fixed effects throughout multivariate regression models, these proxies for
corporate risk taking are orthogonalized onto industry-specific idiosyncratic characteristics, thus
allowing a cleaner analysis of ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk resulting from corporate operating and
investment decisions.
3.4. Managers’ risk-taking incentives
Guay (1999) establishes that managers’ incentive to enhance volatility can be measured by
the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to the volatility of equity value. This measure, also referred to as
convexity or vega, differs from the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to equity value, which is referred
to commonly as delta or slope. Guay (1999) cites Smith and Stulz (1985) and Milgrom and Roberts
(1992) to reason that, by making adjustments to the slope and convexity of the wealth-performance
relation, shareholders can reduce the likelihood that managers forgo positive NPV projects. Thus,
holding the slope constant, a greater convexity in the wealth-performance relation is expected to
shrink the gap between the risk-aversion effect and the wealth-enhancing effect of stock volatility.
VEGA is measured by the change in the value of CEO’s stock options for a 0.01 change in the
annualized standard deviation of stock returns (Guay, 1999). It is derived from the Black-Scholes
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option valuation model (e.g., Yermack, 1995; Hall and Leibman, 1998; Aggarwal and Samwick,
1999; Guay, 1999; Cohen, Hall, and Viceira, 2000; Datta et al., 2001; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002;
Core and Guay, 2002).
3.5. Sample distribution
Table 1 presents the sample distribution by year for CDS firms prior to and after CDS
inception (pre–CDS and post–CDS contract subsamples). We also provide a yearly distribution of
non-CDS firms that serve as a control sample for our tests. The number of observations for firms
subsequent to CDS inception and the number of non-CDS firms monotonically increases up to
2004 and then decreases. Table 2 reports the sample distribution by industry, which is based on
the Campbell (1987) industry classification. Our sample covers a range of industries, the most
heavily represented being Basic (17.67% for the post–CDS contract subsample and 18.77% for
the pre–CDS contract subsample), followed by Utilities (12.52% for the post–CDS contract
subsample and 13.12% for the pre–CDS contract subsample) and Consumer durables (11.99%
for the post–CDS contract subsample and 11.60% for the pre–CDS contract subsample).
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 near here]
3.6. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analyses for CDS firms.
Characteristics are presented separately for periods before and after the initiation of CDS trading
for the CDS firms. Corporate investments in both intangible (R&D) and tangible (CAPEX) assets
decrease following CDS inception, though the percentage decrease in R&D is larger. COGS and
SG&A do not change significantly. Firms reduce M&As and financial leverage and increase cash
savings, consistent with more cautionary investment and financing policies. While sales revenue
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increases, perhaps mechanically over time, market-to-book ratio, stock return, and revenue
growth decrease subsequent to CDS trading initiation.
[Insert Table 3 near here]
4. Tests of hypotheses
This section presents tests of the hypotheses.
4.1. Tests of H1: Changes in risky operating investments upon CDS inception
H1 examines whether firms change their level of risky investments after CDS inception.
We estimate the following regression to test this hypothesis:
RiskyInvestmenti,t =β0 + β1 CDS_TRADEi,t + β2 CDS_FIRMi + ∑βn Controlsi,t +εi,t ,

(2)

where the dependent variable is one of the proxies for risky operating investments: R&D
(contrasted against CAPEX), SG&A (contrasted against COGS), M&A, and OPINCVOL. Dummy
variable CDS_FIRM takes a value of one for firms that have their CDSs traded during our study
period. CDS-traded firms are considered the treatment group after CDS inception. Dummy
variable CDS_TRADE takes a value of one after CDS inception for CDS firms and zero
otherwise. Effectively, it is an interaction of two dummy variables: CDS_FIRM (a variable that
takes a value of one for CDS firms and zero otherwise) × POST_CDS (a variable that takes a
value of one for years after CDS inception for the treatment firms and their matched control
firms and zero otherwise). Including both CDS_TRADE and CDS_FIRM provides a differencein-differences research design to isolate the impact of CDS inception relative to
contemporaneous changes for non-CDS firms. Hence, the variable CDS_TRADE captures the
marginal impact of CDS introduction on the level of risky operating investments relative to the
impact on non-CDS firms over the same time interval. If CDS firms increase (decrease) their
risky investments following the onset of CDS trading, relative to non-CDS firms, then β1 would
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be significantly positive (negative).
We include a set of firm-level and industry-level control variables that affect firms’
investment decisions, consistent with prior research: firm size (SALES), growth opportunity
(MTB), cash availability (SURPLUSCASH), sales growth (SALESGROWTH), stock return
(STRET), net cash flow from operating activities (CFO), and product market competition for a
given industry (HHI). We control for financial leverage (DEBT) that may change post–CDS
inception (Saretto and Tookes, 2013). We use CEO tenure (TENURE), CEO age (CEOAGE), and
total compensation (TOT_COMP) to control for executive characteristics. The above set of
controls is consistent with those used by the literature (e.g., Coles et al., 2006). We include year
and industry fixed effects to control for year and industry idiosyncratic characteristics throughout
all regressions. Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix A.
The first column of Table 4 reports results of equation (2) with R&D as the dependent
variable; the second column, with CAPEX as the dependent variable. The coefficient on
CDS_TRADE is negative for R&D but not significant. The magnitude of the coefficient on
CAPEX is much smaller and is also insignificant. Table 4 presents results with SG&A and COGS
in the third and fourth column, respectively. The coefficients on CDS_TRADE are negative and
positive, respectively, but neither one is significant. We present results using M&A in the fifth
column. The coefficient on CDS_TRADE is negative and significant (p-value < 0.01). The last
column, however, shows an insignificant coefficient on CDS_TRADE with OPINCVOL as the
dependent variable.
[Insert Table 4 near here]
Overall, we do not find any significant change in the proxies for risky investment upon
CDS inception except for M&A. Thus, the null hypothesis H1 is not rejected. In addition, no test
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shows a significant increase in risky investment that would support the asset substitution
argument. Some support does exist for more cautionary investment policies subsequent to CDS
inception, consistent with Bartram et al. (2017).
4.2. Tests of H2: The effect of managerial vega
We test H2 with VEGA as the risk-inducing factor, while controlling for TOT_COMP, in
the following regression:
RiskyInvestmenti,t =β0 + β1 CDS_TRADEi,t
+ β3 VEGAi,t
+ β4 CDS_TRADEi,t × VEGAi,t
+ β5 CDS_FIRMi +∑βn Controlsi,t +εi,t .

(3)

Equation (3) is essentially the same as equation (2) with additional terms of VEGA and its
interaction with CDS_TRADE, which takes a value of one after CDS inception for CDS firms
and zero otherwise. Also included is TOT_COMP, a natural logarithm of the sum of salary,
bonus, long-term incentive plan payouts, the value of restricted stock grants, the value of options
granted during the year, and any other annual pay for the CEO in the fiscal year. A CEO’s risk
aversion should increase with TOT_COMP because he or she would lose future stream of those
amounts upon firm failure.
The coefficient on CDS_TRADE is negative and significant (p-value < 0.01) with SG&A
and M&A as dependent variables and insignificant with R&D and OPINCVOL as dependent
variables. It shows that, absent managerial convexity, borrowers either maintain investment
policies or pursue more conservative investment policies post–CDS inception. The baseline
result is thus that managers who have little to gain from asset volatility but stand to lose most
from the resulting firm failure might reduce risky investments. This finding is consistent with
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Bartram et al. (2017), who find a post–CDS inception decrease in risky investments, on average,
in a global setting.
The coefficient of interest is on the interaction term CDS_TRADE × VEGA.12 If vega
induces managers to increase operating risks following the onset of CDS trading, then β3 should
be significantly positive when the dependent variable is risky corporate investments. Panel A of
Table 5 presents results with different proxies of risky operating investments. The coefficient on
the interaction term CDS_TRADE × VEGA is positive and significant. We find similar results
with R&D, SG&A, M&A, and OPINCVOL as the dependent variables (all coefficients are
positive and significant with p-value < 0.01). These results support the hypothesis that the post–
CDS inception allocation of firm resources toward riskier avenues increases with managers’ vega
incentives, all else held equal. These results are not just about vega incentives, because they are
conditional on CDS inception. Thus, managers with vega incentives appear to act differently
post–CDS inception than managers with no such incentives, all else held equal. We do not find a
risk-increasing effect of vega for relatively safe and tangible investments such as CAPEX and
COGS. On the contrary, we find a negative coefficient on COGS, indicating a shift from COGS
to SG&A post–CDS inception that increases with vega.
[Insert Table 5 near here]
To the extent that asset volatility improves the value of call options built into shareholder
investments, and is contrary to lender interests, vega seems to promote shareholder interests
post–CDS inception, all else held equal.

12

We conduct an additional test using a dummy variable that takes the value one when VEGA is in the highest
tercile for that industry and year. Untabulated results are similar with those obtained using a continuous variable.
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4.3. H1 tests for two extreme terciles of managerial vega
We divide firms into terciles based on the managerial vega. Then, we estimate equation
(1) for the lowest and highest vega groups, which have the least and greatest managerial
incentives to increase asset volatility. Results are presented in Panel B of Table 5 with two
columns each for the low and high vega groups with R&D, SG&A, M&A, and OPINCVOL as the
dependent variables. The coefficient CDS_TRADE is negative and significant for the lowest vega
group (p-value < 0.05) with R&D, SG&A, and M&A as dependent variables, but it is
insignificant for the high vega group. These results indicate that, for low vega managers, the
marginal cost from increased vulnerability to bankruptcy post–CDS inception dominates the
gains from raising asset volatility to take advantage of reduced lender vigilance. These managers
thus purse more conservative investment policies (Arping 2014; Subrahmanyam et al., 2017).
These results are consistent with Low (2009), who finds that an exogenous regulatory shock to
the takeover provision causes firms to reduce their risky investments. However, this shift is
concentrated among firms with low managerial vega.
Coefficients for the highest vega group for R&D, SG&A, and M&A indicate a
counterbalancing of two managerial incentives. That is, high vega managers appear unwilling to
forgo the wealth-enhancing effect of risky investments even when faced with higher
vulnerability to financial distress following CDS inception. They maintain the level of risky
investments.
The results with OPINCVOL as the dependent variable differ from the other three
variables. The volatility of operating profits increases post–CDS inception for high vega firms.
Yet, no test in Table 5 supports the asset substitution argument for the low vega group.
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4.4. Tests of H3: The joint effect of CDS inception and managerial interests on default risk
Results of subsections 4.2 and 4.3 show that vega could induce managers to increase
risky investments post–CDS inception, at the margin. The resulting increase in operating risk
could worsen bankruptcy risk. We test in H3 whether vega incentives are associated with
increase in bankruptcy risk after CDS inception. We estimate
BANKRUPTCYi,t =β0 + β1 CDS_TRADEi,t
+ β3 VEGAi,t
+ β4 CDS_TRADEi,t × VEGAi,t
+ β5 CDS_FIRMi +∑βn Controlsi,t +εi,t ,

(4)

where BANKRUPTCY is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if a firm files for
bankruptcy in the next five years after a given year t. As in H2 tests, our main interest is the
coefficient on the interaction term CDS_TRADE × VEGA, which we expect to be positive based
on H3. We follow Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) and include a vector of firm-level control
variables, which are known to affect corporate bankruptcy risk: firm size (MKV), debt size
(DEBT), stock return (STRET), stock return volatility (STRETVOL), and profitability (ROA).
We also control for executive characteristics (Gormley, Matsa, and Milbourn, 2013; Switzer
and Wang, 2013; Faccio, Marchica, and Mura, 2016) by including CEO total compensation
(TOT_COMP) and CEO tenure (TENURE) as control variables.
The first and second columns of Table 6, Panel A, present results without and after
considering vega incentives, respectively. In the first column, the coefficient on CDS_TRADE is
significant and positive (p-value < 0.01), showing that firms’ bankruptcy risk increases
subsequent to CDS trading, consistent with Subrahmanyam et al. (2014). In the second column,
the coefficient on CDS_TRADE becomes insignificant, indicating that, absent managers’ vega
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incentives, no change in bankruptcy risk takes place post–CDS inception. The coefficient on the
interaction term CDS_TRADE × VEGA is positive and significant (p-value < 0.05), supporting
the view that, at the margin, managers with high vega incentives change firm policies in a
manner that increases the likelihood of bankruptcy risk after the onset of CDS trading.
[Insert Table 6 near here]
We next estimate the effect of CDS inception on the likelihood of bankruptcy separately
for high and low vega groups. Panel B shows that the increase in bankruptcy likelihood is
confined to the high vega group. These results indicate that the effect of increased lender
inflexibility upon CDS inception on bankruptcy likelihood is more nuanced than previously
considered in the literature. Results are consistent with the idea that low vega firms change their
operating policy [or change other firm policies such as precautionary cash (Subrahmanyam et al.,
2017)] to potentially mollify the vulnerability created by lender inflexibility post–CDS inception.
Large vega firms do not change their policies in the direction, or do not change them enough, to
ward off the enhanced bankruptcy threat.
5. Changes in managerial compensation
H1–H3 test results indicate that, after CDS inception, low vega managers may forgo risky,
positive NPV projects to a greater extent than before. If the previous levels of operational riskreturn trade-offs were optimal for the shareholders, then low vega managers would deviate from
shareholder-preferred policies. Firms with high vega might not forgo risky projects to the same
extent. Shareholders may then alter managerial compensation by increasing managerial vega to
enhance managers’ risk-taking incentives (Lee et al., 2017). We test this idea by estimating
VEGAi,t =β0 + β1 CDS_TRADEi,t + β2 CDS_FIRMi + ∑βn Controlsi,t +εi,t .
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(5)

We follow prior literature in employing a vector of control variables (Coles et al., 2006):
firm size (SALES), financial leverage (DEBT), growth opportunity (MTB), cash availability
(SURPLUSCASH), sales growth (SALESGROWTH), CEO tenure (TENURE), total compensation
(TOT_COMP), stock return (STRET), and stock return volatility (STRETVOL). Table 7 shows
that the coefficient on CDS_TRADE is positive and significant (p-value < 0.01), indicating that
shareholders increase CEO vega after CDS inception. The economic significance of this increase,
relative to the change for non-CDS firms, over the same period is estimated by dividing the
regression coefficient by the mean value post–CDS inception, which amounts to 20% (= 0.0525 /
0.2588) for VEGA.

In unreported tests, we find that total compensation increases in a

statistically, but not economically, significant manner [1% (= 0.1079 / 8.856) of its mean value].
So, the principal change in managers’ compensation structure appears to be an increase in
convexity, not the total value. In a work subsequent to ours, Lee et al (2017) predict increase in
vega based on an analytical model.
[Insert Table 7 near here]
In sum, the outcome of CDS inception on operating policies that affect managerial and
shareholder wealth is more nuanced than previously considered in the literature; that is, it
depends on managerial incentives. We thus present a fuller picture of manager-shareholder and
lender-shareholder conflicts and shifts in the rival lender, shareholder, and managerial forces that
determine firms’ investment and financing policies post–CDS inception. In this respect, we
respond to the Augustin et al. (2014) call for a thorough examination of changes in corporate
policy and stakeholder interests upon CDS inception.
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6. Robustness checks
In this section, we examine whether our main findings are robust to alternative
econometric specifications.
6.1. Identifying lender banks that most likely used CDS contracts
In Section 5 tests, we assume that a significant number of lenders buy protection via CDSs
after they become available, an assumption that is consistent with previous empirical studies on the
effects of CDSs. Our identification of altered borrower-lender relationship could improve if we
could isolate cases of lenders buying CDS protection. However, CDS contracts are traded over the
counter. Identifying banks that purchase credit insurance on the borrower is empirically
challenging. Martin and Roychowdhury (2015) propose that a bank likely purchases CDS
protection against a borrower’s default risk if the bank increases its risk-based capital ratio in the
same year in which the borrower’s CDS trading was initiated. This argument is based on the
proposition that a bank can increase its risk-based capital ratio upon hedging its credit risk. Hence,
we expect that the phenomena we show in this paper are stronger for firms whose lender banks
likely purchase CDS contracts.
We identify lenders to CDS and non-CDS firms in our sample using the Dealscan database,
and we obtain banks’ risk-based capital ratio from the Federal Reserve Y-9C reports. We divide
the borrower sample into two groups: those with increases in their banks’ risk-based capital ratio
and those with decreases in the year of CDS inception. We then reestimate equation (3), examining
the joint effect of CDS inception and managerial incentives on risky investment policies.
Table 8 presents results of this analysis. The coefficients on the interaction term
CDS_TRADE × VEGA are significantly stronger for firms with banks experiencing increases in riskbased capital ratio for all dependent variables. For bankruptcy risk, the coefficient on the interaction
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term is significant only for firms with an increase in banks’ risk-based capital ratio. Thus, the vegainduced risk-increasing effects are stronger when lenders hedge their client risks with traded CDSs
and, hence, reduce their vigilance.
[Insert Table 8 here]
6.2. Endogenous choice of compensation and corporate investments: 3SLS specification
We examine the joint effect of CDS inception and vega on corporate investment policies,
by assuming that the onset of CDS trading and managerial compensation are independent factors.
However, they might reciprocally cause each other. Vega can exacerbate lender-shareholder
conflict (Daniel et al., 2004) leading to greater lender demand for CDS. CDS inception might be
followed by an increase in vega, as we find and as predicted theoretically by Lee et al. (2017).
Furthermore, omitted firm characteristics may drive the firm’s choice of risky investment and the
equilibrium vega given to its managers (Core and Guay, 2002). These endogeneity issues can
lead to biased coefficients in our main tests. We address these issues by employing a 3SLS model
that provides efficient estimates when error terms are correlated across equations (Zellner and
Theil, 1962).13 We simultaneously estimate the system of following three regressions
Prob(CDS_TRADEi,t=1) = β0 + β1VEGAi,t + β2 RiskyInvestmenti,t
+ β3IPBTVi,t + β4 IGSGFi,t + ∑βn ControlsI,t + ε,

(7)

VEGA = β0 + β1 CDS_TRADEi,t + β2 RiskyInvestment i,t + ∑βn Controlsi,t + ε,

(8)

and
RiskyInvestmenti,t =β0 + β1 CDS_TRADEi,t + β3 VEGAi,t + β4 CDS_TRADEi,t × VEGAi,t
13

In the first stage, instrumental variables are developed for all of the endogenous variables by combining the other
endogeneous variables and the exogenous variables. In the second stage, the estimates are computed based on the
residuals of the first-stage estimates for each equation. Finally, in the third stage, a generalized least squares
estimation is done using the covariance matrix of the second stage and using the developed instrumental variables
instead of the endogenous variables.
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+ β5 CDS_FIRMi +∑βn Controlsi,t +εi,t .

(9)

Each of the three regressions includes the other two endogenous variables as regressors.
Equation (7) includes VEGA, a proxy for corporate risk taking (R&D, SG&A, M&A, or
OPINCVOL), all variables of the CDS determinant model specified in equation (1), and all control
variables in equation (2) and equations (4)–(6). In addition, equation (7) includes two instrumental
variables: Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume and Investment / Speculative Grade Frontier. So,
3SLS combines the features of seemingly unrelated regressions, by simultaneously estimating
the three equations, and a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach, with inclusion of two
instrumental variables.
The two instrumental variables predict the initiation of CDS trading but are likely to be
unrelated to residuals in equation (7). The first variable proxies for the degree to which investors
can hedge and speculate in the bond market in the absence of the CDS market.14 Following prior
studies, we compute this variable by the average of the industry peers’ bond trading volume
(Boehmer, Chava, and Tookes, 2015; Kim, Shroff, Vyas, and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2017). Bond
trading volume should reduce the likelihood of CDS inception. Higher bond market liquidity
alleviates trading friction, thereby reducing the demand for CDS contracts. We extract data on the
bond trading volume for industry peers from the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine
(TRACE) database. We also collect data on the face value of traded bonds on the issue date from
the Mergent database. We divide the dollar volume of a traded bond by its face value to estimate
its trading volume. We then compute the average bond trading volume of industry peers per year.
We convert this measure into a decile rank (Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume).

14

Oehmke and Zawadowski (2015) illustrate that credit investors choose the CDS market as the trading venue for their
credit hedging and speculative objectives when they face trading frictions in the underlying bond market.
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Our second instrumental variable, Investment / Speculative Grade Frontier, proxies for the
demand for CDS trade. Qiu and Yu (2012) demonstrate an inverse U-shaped relation between CDS
liquidity and credit rating. That is, bond investors’ hedging demand is the lowest for bonds at the
extreme values of investment and speculative grades. Bonds with very high credit quality have
little hedging demand because of their high credit quality. For below investment grade bonds,
credit protection is too costly. Investment / Speculative Grade Frontier is an indicator variable that
takes a value of one if the credit rating of a firm’s bonds is close to the crossover from
investment to speculative grades; that is, the bonds have an average credit rating of BBB–, BBB,
or BBB+. We obtain corporate long-term bond credit ratings from Compustat.
We present the results of the system of equations in Panels A–D of Table 9, with R&D,
SG&A, M&A, and OPINCVOL, respectively, as a proxy for RiskyInvestment. The coefficient on
the interaction term CDS_TRADE × VEGA is positive and significant for R&D, SG&A, and M&A,
with p-value < 0.01. For OPINCVOL, the coefficient is significant at p-value < 0.10. Thus, our
main results remain qualitatively unchanged using the 3SLS models, indicating that they are less
likely affected by endogeneity issues.
7. Conclusion
In this study, we investigate whether and how a borrower changes its investment policy
after its lender obtains insurance on its loaned assets via a credit default swap. Prior studies show
that, upon obtaining insurance, the lender reduces its monitoring of the borrower’s activities and
less flexibly accommodates a financially distressed borrower’s needs. We hypothesize that
reduced monitoring can cause the borrower to increase risky investments, to improve the value
of call options built into its shareholder investments. However, less lender flexibility can cause
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the borrower to pursue a more conservative investment policy to lower its vulnerability to
financial distress.
We find that the borrower pursues a more conservative investment policy post–CDS
inception when its managers have low convexity to stock price incentives. That is, when
managers stand to lose their personal and employment capital from increased vulnerability to
bankruptcy, but gain little from the additional asset volatility, they shift to more conservative
investment policies (Arping 2014; Subrahmanyam et al., 2017). When managers have high vega,
they do not reduce risky investments after CDS inception, indicating a counterbalance between
the wealth-creating effect of asset volatility and the wealth-reducing effect of bankruptcy
likelihood. Thus, we show a nuanced pattern of changes in the borrower’s investment policy
following CDS inception, depending on the interaction between the manager-shareholder and
lender-shareholder conflicts. We thus present a fuller picture of shifts in the triad of lender,
shareholder, and managerial forces that determine firms’ investment policies post–CDS
inception.
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Appendix A
Variable definitions
BANKRUPTCY = Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm files for bankruptcy in the
next five years and zero otherwise. (Source: Securities Data Company Platinum bankruptcy
database)
CAPEX = Capital expenditure net of sales of property, plant, and equipment, divided by assets at
the end of fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat North America)
CDS_FIRM = Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm has traded CDSs anytime
during our study period (1992–2014) and zero otherwise. (Source: Markit)
CDS_TRADE = Dummy variable that takes a value of one for the CDS firm in the year after its
CDS starts trading and zero otherwise. (Source: Markit)
CEOAGE = Natural logarithm of CEO’s age (Source: Compustat ExecuComp)
CFO = Net cash flow from operating activities divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year t.
(Source: Compustat North America)
CFVOL = Standard deviation of firm’s CFO from fiscal year t−4 to fiscal year t. (Source:
Compustat North America)
COGS = COGS to operating costs (SALE − OIADP) ratio at the end of fiscal year t. (Source:
Compustat North America)
CREDIT_RATE = Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm has an S&P credit rating
and zero otherwise. (Source: Compustat North America)
DEBT = Natural logarithm of firm’s total debt (short-term debt plus long-term debt) at the end of
fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat North America)
DIV_RATIO = Dividend payout ratio; dividends paid to common shareholders over market value
of equity. (Source: Compustat North America)
EVOL = Standard deviation of firm’s ROA from fiscal year t−4 to fiscal year t. (Source:
Compustat North America)
HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
industry to which the firm belongs, measured at the end of fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat
North America)
Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume = Average annual bond trading volume for the firm’s two38
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digit SIC industry peers. (Source: TRACE)
Investment / Speculative Grade Frontier = Indicator variable that takes a value of one if the
firm’s long-term bonds outstanding in a given year have an average credit rating of BBB-,
BBB, or BBB+ and zero otherwise. (Source: Compustat North America)
INV_GRADE = Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm has an S&P credit rating
above BB+ and zero otherwise. (Source: Compustat North America)
M&A = Natural logarithm of number of mergers and acquisitions, which are counted separately
in the pre– and post–CDS periods. (Source: First Call)
MKV = Natural logarithm of firm’s market value at the end of fiscal year t, calculated as
(number of outstanding shares × market price). (Source: Compustat North America)
MTB = Market value divided by book value of equity at the end of fiscal year t.

(Source:

Compustat North America)
OPINCVOL = Standard deviation of firm’s profitability ratio, operating income after
depreciation over total assets, for fiscal year t to t+3. (Source: Compustat North America)
PRE_SFAS123R = Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm’s data date is before the
effective date of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 123R (June 15, 2005) and
zero otherwise. (Source: Compustat North America)
PROFITMARGIN = Net income divided by sales at the end of fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat
North America)
R&D = Research and development expenditure divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year t.
Set to zero if missing. (Source: Compustat North America)
Risk capital ratio = Lender’s total risk-based capital divided by risk-weighted assets from
Federal Reserve Y-9C reports. Risk-based capital requirement refers to a rule that
establishes minimum required liquid reserves or regulatory capital for financial institutions.
Risk-based capital requirements exist to protect financial firms, their investors, and their
clients. Banks lending to CDS firms and non-CDS firms in the sample are identified using
data obtained from the Loan Pricing Corporation Dealscan database. (Source: Federal
Reserve Y-9C reports and Loan Pricing Corporation Dealscan)
ROA = Return on assets; net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the end
of fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat North America)
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S&P500 = Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm is in the S&P 500 index at the
end of fiscal year t and zero otherwise. (Source: Compustat North America)
SALES = Natural logarithm of net sales at the end of fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat North
America)
SALESGROWTH = Change in net sales in year t divided by net sales in year t−1. (Source:
Compustat North America)
SG&A = SG&A to operating costs (SALE − OIADP) at the end of fiscal year t. (Source:
Compustat North America)
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat North
America)
STRET = Firm’s annual stock return for fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat North America)
STRETVOL = Standard deviation of the firm’s monthly stock return in fiscal year t. (Source:
Compustat North America)
SURPLUSCASH = Cash from assets-in-place divided by total assets (Coles et al., 2006).
Calculated as operating activities net cash flow minus depreciation and amortization plus
research and development expense at the end of fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat North
America)
TENURE = Natural logarithm of the number of years the CEO held his or her position. Number
of years is calculated as the difference between the current fiscal year and the year reported
for “date became CEO” in Compustat ExecuComp. (Source: Compustat ExecuComp)
TOT_COMP = Natural logarithm of the sum of salary, bonus, long-term incentive plan payouts,
the value of restricted stock grants, the value of options granted during the year, and any
other annual pay for the CEO in fiscal year t. (Source: Compustat ExecuComp)
VEGA = Dollar change in the executive’s wealth for a 0.01 change in standard deviation of
returns. (Source: Compustat ExecuComp)
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Appendix B
Implementing propensity matched score method
This table reports results using the propensity matching approach, which involves pairing
treatment and control firms based on similar observable characteristics (Dehejia and Wahba,
2002). The dependent variable, CDS_Firm, equals one if a credit default swap (CDS) is traded
on the firm any time during our study period (1992–2014) and zero otherwise. The independent
variables are INV_GRADE, an indicator variable that equals one if the firm has a Standard &
Poor’s (S&P) credit rating above BB+ and zero otherwise; CREDIT_RATE, an indicator variable
that equals one if the firm has an S&P credit rating and zero otherwise; MTB, the ratio of market
value of equity to book value of equity; PROFITMARGIN, net income divided by sales; and
STRETVOL, standard deviation of monthly stock return within a fiscal year. The other variables
are defined in Appendix A. The sample includes firms with and without traded CDSs during the
study period. For CDS firms, only firm-years prior to the onset of CDS trading are included in
the sample. t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by industry
and year. Panel A reports estimation results of a logistic model to predict the onset of CDS
trading. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Panel B
reports the standardized differences between CDS firms and the matched non-CDS firms for
covariate balancing. Standardized differences of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 correspond to small, medium,
and large differences between the treatment sample and the control sample (Cohen, 1988).
Panel A: First-stage logit model
Variable
Intercept

Estimate
−7.592019
(−14.63)***
0.2104
(2.4192)**
1.0496
(8.9653)***
0.6891
(3.5621)***
−0.0335
(−0.1573)
0.3462
(13.0236)***
−1.8892
(−2.9139)***
−0.1052
(−3.4763)***

INV_GRADE
CREDIT_RATE
DEBT
PROFITMARGIN
SIZE
STRETVOL
MTB

Year fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Number of observations
Chi-squared
Percent concordant
Percent discordant

Yes
Yes
24,855
1841.59 (p-value < 0.0001)
91.5
7.8
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Panel B: Covariate balance analysis
Variable
VEGA
R&D
CAPEX
SG&A
COGS
M&A
OPINCVOL
TOT_COMP
CEOAGE
TENURE
SALES
MTB
SURPLUSCASH
SALESGROWTH
STRET
STRETVOL
DEBT
ROA
CFO
HHI
S&P500

CDS firms
Mean
Variance
0.2045
0.0662
0.0179
0.0013
0.0545
0.0025
0.1925
0.0350
0.7393
0.0399
1.3907
0.9800
0.0219
0.0011
8.5260
0.9110
4.0289
0.0107
1.6927
0.6995
8.6103
1.6422
3.2234
10.8570
0.0385
0.0046
0.0747
0.0329
0.1624
0.1664
0.0893
0.0027
0.2767
0.0240
0.0500
0.0035
0.0946
0.0038
0.0667
0.0004
0.6380
0.2310

Non-CDS firms
Mean
Variance
0.2022
0.0748
0.0150
0.0012
0.0500
0.0022
0.1984
0.0342
0.7324
0.0387
1.9526
1.1589
0.0207
0.0008
8.5601
1.2627
4.0238
0.0142
1.7203
0.7087
8.3778
1.8482
2.9638
10.1482
0.0306
0.0057
0.0783
0.0404
0.1730
0.1862
0.0925
0.0031
0.2911
0.0387
0.0407
0.0038
0.1023
0.0045
0.0564
0.0029
0.3554
0.2291

Standardized difference
Mean
Variance
0.0088
0.8849
0.0837
1.0327
0.0933
1.1153
−0.0321
1.0254
0.0351
1.0300
−0.5433
0.8456
0.0398
1.4009
−0.0327
0.7215
-0.0168
0.8707
−0.0330
0.9871
0.1760
0.8886
0.0801
1.0698
0.1097
0.8133
−0.0185
0.8130
−0.0251
0.8936
−0.0581
0.8646
−0.0813
0.6204
0.1540
0.9255
0.1837
0.9217
0.0066
1.1315
0.5892
1.0081
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Table 1
Sample distribution by fiscal year
This table reports the sample distribution across years. The sample consists of 14,606
firm-year observations for the period between 1992 and 2014.
Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Total

Credit default swap (CDS) firms
Before CDS inception
After CDS inception
100
245
263
291
303
317
339
349
367
236
147
166
227
97
300
60
349
31
370
21
371
14
378
8
380
7
376
5
369
3
368
1
365
358
356
3,223
4,714

Non-CDS firms
102
243
273
281
298
310
330
324
349
339
347
363
345
338
306
308
278
264
261
259
251
251
249
6,669
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Table 2
Sample distribution by industry (number of firm-years)
This table reports the sample distribution across the Campbell (1987) industry
classifications. The sample consists of 14,606 firm-year observations for the period between
1992 and 2014.

Industry
Basic
Capital goods
Construction
Consumer durables
Food/tobacco
Leisure
Petroleum
Real estate and financial
Services
Textiles/trade
Transportation
Utilities
Other industries
Total

Credit default swap (CDS) firms
Before CDS
After CDS inception
inception
605
833
361
502
93
155
374
565
126
186
96
137
204
272
233
585
310
358
294
361
80
115
423
590
24
55
3,223
4,714

Non-CDS firms
770
705
96
959
239
173
352
1,257
457
468
182
947
64
6,669
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Table 3
Sample descriptive statistics for credit default swap (CDS) firms, before and after CDS inception
This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample firms. All variables are defined in
Appendix A. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.

Variable
VEGA
R&D
CAPEX
SG&A
COGS
M&A
OPINCVOL
BANKRUPTLCY
TENURE
TOT_COMP
CEOAGE
SALES
MTB
SURPLUSCASH
SALESGROWTH
STRET
STRETVOL
LEV
ROA
CFO
HHI
S&P500

Before CDS inception
Standard
Mean
deviation
0.1243
0.1831
0.0212
0.0408
0.0663
0.0542
0.1908
0.1879
0.7387
0.1983
1.5130
0.9843
0.0229
0.0271
0.0031
0.0559
1.7555
0.8766
8.0392
0.9846
4.0238
0.1191
8.0837
1.2486
3.5386
3.4774
0.0343
0.0764
0.1121
0.1978
0.1932
0.4306
0.2752
0.1587
0.0537
0.0597
0.5883
0.4992
0.1023
0.0671
0.0564
0.0518
0.4610
0.4985

After CDS inception
Standard
Mean
deviation
0.2591
0.2846
0.0156
0.0314
0.0465
0.0446
0.1937
0.1866
0.7398
0.2007
1.3028
0.0143
0.0212
0.0369
0.0135
0.1153
1.6494
0.8056
8.8562
0.7774
4.0289
0.1035
8.9666
1.1778
3.0121
3.1429
0.0413
0.0616
0.0490
0.1653
0.1422
0.3911
0.2774
0.1521
0.0476
0.0595
0.6719
0.4696
0.0946
0.0613
0.0667
0.0669
0.5143
0.4998
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After − before
Mean
difference
0.1348***
−0.0056***
−0.0199***
0.0028
0.0011
−0.2102***
−0.0017**
0.0104***
−0.1062***
0.8169***
0.0051**
0.8829***
−0.5265***
0.0070***
−0.0631***
−0.0510***
0.0023
−0.0061***
0.8169***
−0.0078***
0.013***
0.0836***

Table 4
Corporate investment policy after the initiation of credit default swap (CDS) trading
This table reports the effect of CDS trading upon corporate investment policy: R&D, CAPEX, SG&A, COGS, M&A, and OPINCVOL. All variables
are defined in Appendix A. The sample for R&D, CAPEX, SG&A, and COGS consists of 6,669 non-CDS firm-years and 7,937 CDS firm-years (3,223 firmyears for pre–CDS initiation and 4,714 firm-years for post–CDS initiation). The sample for M&A consists of 6,539 non-CDS firm-years and 7,843 CDS firmyears (3,146 firm-years for pre–CDS initiation and 4,697 firm-years for post–CDS initiation). The sample for OPINCVOL consists of 5,833 non-CDS firmyears and 7,247 CDS firm-years (3,128 firm-years for pre–CDS initiation and 4,119 firm-years for post–CDS initiation). Year and industry fixed effects are
included. t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by year and industry are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and
0.01 level, respectively, two-tailed in control variables and one-tailed when discussing the results of hypothesis tests with predicted signs of coefficient
estimates.

Variable
CDS_TRADE (CDS_FIRM × POST_CDS)
CDS_FIRM
TENURE
TOT_COMP
CEOAGE
SALES
MTB
ROA
SURPLUSCASH
SALEGLOWTH
DEBT

R&D
−0.0013
(−0.72)
0.0022
(1.09)
0.0008
(1.89)*
0.0024
(2.53)**
−0.0055
(−1.17)
−0.0005
(−0.49)
0.0006
(2.25)**
0.0367
(1.84)*
−0.5566
(−7.06)***
0.0011
(0.74)
−0.0157
(−2.66)***

CAPEX
−0.0002
(−0.06)
0.0010
(0.42)
0.0007
(0.54)
−0.0021
(−2.53)**
−0.0016
(−0.21)
−0.0012
(−0.77)
0.0004
(1.15)
0.0299
(1.64)
−0.1667
(−3.65)***
0.0045
(0.98)
0.0070
(0.89)

Dependent variable
SG&A
COGS
−0.0061
(−0.40)
−0.0219
(−2.55)**
−0.0011
(−0.21)
0.0230
(4.24)***
−0.0003
(−0.01)
−0.0153
(−2.04)**
0.0080
(3.93)***
0.2828
(1.48)
−1.0953
(−7.71)***
−0.0030
(−0.15)
−0.1218
(−3.00)***
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0.0009
(0.06)
0.0264
(2.82)***
0.0019
(0.32)
−0.0298
(−4.79)***
−0.0045
(−0.13)
0.0226
(2.67)***
−0.0062
(−3.06)***
−0.1850
(−1.06)
1.3895
(12.08)***
−0.0023
(−0.10)
0.0716
(1.62)

M&A
−0.3569
(−3.46)***
−0.4182
(−5.94)***
−0.0206
(−0.58)
0.1184
(1.63)
−0.3744
(−1.00)
0.1357
(2.85)***
0.0001
(0.01)
−0.2208
(−0.34)
−1.6042
(−2.89)***
0.2259
(1.23)
0.0297
(0.12)

OPINCVOL
0.0012
(0.61)
−0.0007
(−0.42)
−0.0009
(−1.74)*
0.0003
(0.42)
−0.0042
(−1.37)
−0.0022
(−3.49)***
0.0004
(2.23)**
−0.0123
(−1.42)
−0.1259
(−7.57)***
0.0028
(1.72)*
0.0007
(0.21)

−0.0509
(−2.72)***
0.0011
(0.80)
0.4889
(6.97)***

HHI
STRET
CFO

Number of observations
Adj. R-squared

14,606
0.751

0.0584
(1.85)*
−0.0040
(−2.77)***
0.3166
(4.75)***

−0.2057
(−0.90)
−0.0202
(−1.88)*
1.1414
(7.00)***

0.1988
(1.05)
0.0267
(2.46)**
−1.6458
(−9.14)***

−1.2084
(−1.99)**
0.0698
(1.58)
1.3082
(2.78)***

0.0126
(1.06)
0.0022
(1.69)*
0.1406
(6.86)***

14,606
0.487

14,606
0.425

14,606
0.403

14,382
0.208

13,080
0.283
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Table 5
Corporate investment policy after the initiation of credit default swap (CDS) trading, conditional on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation structure
Panel A reports the effect of chief executive officer compensation structure on corporate investment policy post–CDS inception: R&D, CAPEX,
SG&A, COGS, M&A, and OPINCVOL. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The sample for R&D, CAPEX, SG&A, and COGS consists of 6,669 nonCDS firm-years and 7,937 CDS firm-years (3,223 firm-years for pre–CDS initiation and 4,714 firm-years for post–CDS initiation). The sample for M&A
consists of 6,539 non-CDS firm-years and 7,843 CDS firm-years (3,146 firm-years for pre–CDS initiation and 4,697 firm-years for post–CDS initiation). The
sample for OPINCVOL consists of 5,833 non-CDS firm-years and 7,247 CDS firm-years (3,128 firm-years for pre–CDS initiation and 4,119 firm-years for
post–CDS initiation). Year and industry fixed effects are included. t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by year and industry are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, two-tailed in control variables and one-tailed when discussing
the results of hypothesis tests with predicted signs of coefficient estimates. Panel B reports the effect of CDS inception on risky operating investments, R&D,
SG&A, M&A, and OPINCVOL, by the level of VEGA. All firms are divided into three groups by the level of VEGA. The results for the lowest and highest
VEGA groups are presented in the first and second columns under the heading of each risky operating investment, respectively.
Panel A: Operating investments post-CDS inception, conditioned on VEGA
Variable
CDS_TRADE (CDS_FIRM × POST_CDS)
VEGA
CDS_TRADE × VEGA

Firm-level controls
Number of observations
Adj. R-squared

R&D
−0.0024
(−1.27)
0.0005
(0.13)
0.0039
(6.54)***

CAPEX
0.0007
(0.24)
−0.0065
(−1.22)
−0.0021
(−0.71)

Dependent variable
SG&A
COGS
−0.0251
0.0236
(−4.60)***
(1.86)*
0.0363
−0.0384
(4.52)***
(−4.22)***
0.0718
−0.0865
(3.03)***
(−1.80)**

M&A
−0.4469
(−9.28)***
0.1139
(3.09)***
0.3337
(5.05)***

OPINCVOL
0.0007
(1.26)
−0.0039
(−2.44)**
0.0023
(2.66)***

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

14,606
0.752

14,460
0.489

14,606
0.436

14,606
0.414

14,382
0.213

13,080
0.284
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Table 5 continued
Panel B: Operating investments post-CDS inception, examined separately for high and low vega groups
Dependent variable
R&D
SG&A
M&A
Lowest
Highest
Lowest
Highest
Lowest
Highest
Variable
VEGA group VEGA group VEGA group VEGA group VEGA group VEGA group
CDS_TRADE
−0.0021
−0.0034
−0.0235
−0.0151
−0.5700
−0.1547
(CDS_FIRM × POST_CDS)
(−2.46)**
(−1.53)
(−2.45)**
(−0.46)
(−3.76)***
(−1.47)
Difference in
CDS_TRADE

0.0029
(1.66)**

Firm-level controls
Number of observations
Adj. R-squared

0.0084
(0.49)

OPINCVOL
Lowest
Highest
VEGA group VEGA group
0.0017
0.0070
(0.66)
(2.24)**

0.4153
(2.41)***

0.0053
(1.84)**

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

4,869
0.751

4,872
0.720

4,869
0.279

4,872
0.418

4,782
0.218

4,790
0.253

4,405
0.322

4,275
0.213
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Table 6
Likelihood of corporate bankruptcy after the initiation of credit default swap (CDS) trading
This table reports the joint effect of CDS inception and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation
structure on the risk of bankruptcy. BANKRUPTCY is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm files for
bankruptcy in the next five years and zero otherwise. VEGA is the dollar change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in
standard deviation of returns. Control variables are defined in Appendix A. The sample consists of 6,396 non-CDS
firm-years and 7,753 CDS firm-years (3,124 firm-years for pre–CDS initiation and 4,629 firm-years for post–CDS
initiation). Panel A reports the effect of CDS inception on the risk of bankruptcy, conditioning on VEGA. All firms are
divided into three groups by the level of VEGA. The results for the lowest and highest VEGA groups are presented in
the first and second columns of Panel B under each heading, respectively. t-statistics based on robust standard errors
clustered by year and industry are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Bankruptcy risk post-CDS inception, conditioned on VEGA
Variable
Dependent variable: BANKRUPTCY
CDS_TRADE (CDS_FIRM × POST_CDS)
0.0102
−0.0067
(4.68)***
(−1.44)
VEGA
0.0113
(1.41)
CDS_TRADE × VEGA
0.0651
(2.24)**
CDS_FIRM
0.0032
0.0038
(2.99)***
(1.75)*
TENURE
0.0070
0.0016
(3.84)***
(0.49)
TOT_COMP
0.0020
−0.0008
(2.38)**
(−0.56)
CEOAGE
0.0041
0.0051
(1.15)
(0.77)
MKV
0.0021
−0.0008
(3.38)***
(−0.57)
DEBT
0.0001
0.0009
(0.33)
(0.99)
STRET
−0.0015
0.0006
(−1.12)
(0.51)
STRETVOL
0.0049
0.0127
(0.45)
(1.00)
MTB
−0.0002
−0.0004
(−2.07)**
(−1.83)*
ROA
−0.0040
−0.0152
(−0.27)
(−0.88)
CFO
0.0249
0.0135
(2.72)***
(1.33)
SALEGLOWTH
0.0088
0.0074
(2.19)**
(1.20)
Number of observations
Pseudo R-squared

14,149
0.030

14,149
0.060
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Table 6 continued
Panel B: Bankruptcy risk post-CDS inception, conditioned on tercile rank of VEGA
Dependent variable: BANKRUPTCY
Variable
Lowest VEGA group
Highest VEGA group
CDS_TRADE (CDS_FIRM × POST_CDS)
0.0021
0.0130
(1.42)
(2.02)**
Difference in CDS_TRADE
0.0109
(1.96)**
CDS_FIRM
−0.0002
0.0163
(−1.21)
(3.09)***
TENURE
0.0002
0.0234
(0.09)
(3.79)***
TOT_COMP
0.0016
0.0031
(1.65)*
(1.04)
CEOAGE
0.0055
0.0095
(1.35)
(0.68)
MKV
−0.0009
0.0058
(−1.59)
(2.44)**
DEBT
0.0006
0.0012
(1.64)
(0.82)
STRET
−0.0002
−0.0018
(−0.19)
(−0.37)
STRETVOL
0.0036
0.0194
(0.30)
(0.40)
MTB
0.0001
−0.0009
(1.26)
(−2.41)**
ROA
0.0023
−0.0037
(0.71)
(−0.07)
CFO
0.0024
0.0817
(1.01)
(2.44)**
SALEGLOWTH
0.0002
0.0211
(0.36)
(1.44)
Number of observations
Pseudo R-squared

4,778
0.057
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4,744
0.066

Table 7
Changes in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation structure after the initiation of credit default swap (CDS)
trading
This table reports the effect of CDS trading on chief executive officer total compensation. VEGA is the
dollar change in CEO wealth for a 1% change in standard deviation of stock returns. Control variables are defined in
Appendix A. Sample consists of 6,539 non-CDS firm-years and 7,843 CDS firm-years (3,146 firm-years for pre–
CDS initiation and 4,697 firm-years for post–CDS initiation). Year and industry fixed effects are included. tstatistics based on robust standard errors clustered by year and industry are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, two-tailed in control variables and one-tailed when
discussing the results of hypothesis tests with predicted signs of coefficient estimates.
Dependent variable: VEGA
Full sample
0.0525
(3.12)***

Variable
CDS_TRADE

−0.0595
(−1.91)*
0.0460
(5.02)***
0.1432
(6.58)***
0.1109
(0.69)
0.0500
(4.32)***
0.0102
(2.95)***
−0.1437
(−1.62)
0.1228
(0.83)
0.2686
(1.09)
−0.3627
(−1.93)*
0.0733
(1.23)
−0.0635
(−2.80)***
0.0677
(0.27)
−0.1859
(−2.17)**

CDS_FIRM
TENURE
TOT_COMP
CEOAGE
SALES
MTB
DEBT
ROA
CFO
SURPLUSCASH
SALEGLOWTH
STRET
STRETVOL
HHI

Year fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Number of observations
Adj. R-squared

Yes
Yes
14,382
0.258
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Table 8
Effect of credit default swap (CDS) inception on the borrowers’ investment policy, conditioned on the lender hedging its client risk
This table reports results on the relation between CDS inception and borrower’s investment policy, conditional on the likelihood of lender hedging its
client risk. We identify lenders to CDS firms and non-CDS firms in our sample using the Dealscan database, and we collect the risk weights on banks’ assets from
the Federal Reserve Y-9C reports. We infer that lenders that increased risk capital ratio in the year in which the client’s CDSs started trading are more likely to
have hedged their risk with respect to the specific borrower through CDS contracts. We split the sample into two categories: firm-year observations with
lenders that increase capital ratio and those that decrease capital ratio. All variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust
standard errors clustered by industry and year. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, two-tailed in control variables
and one-tailed when discussing the results of hypothesis tests with predicted signs of coefficient estimates.

Variable
CDS_TRADE
(CDS_FIRM × POST_CDS)
VEGA
CDS_TRADE × VEGA

R&D
Risk capital
Risk capital
ratio
ratio
decreases
increases
0.0006
−0.0064
(0.18)
(−2.41)**
0.0000
0.0032
(0.00)
(1.25)
0.0033
0.0174
(1.51)
(2.45)**

SG&A
Risk capital
Risk capital
ratio
ratio
decreases
increases
−0.0411
−0.0183
(−5.22)***
(−2.23)**
0.0349
0.0583
(2.50)**
(2.38)**
0.0239
0.0720
(1.57)
(1.80)*

0.0141
(2.08)**

0.0481
(1.79)*

Difference in
CDS_TRADE × VEGA
Firm-level controls
Number of observations
Adj. R-squared

Dependent variable
M&A
Risk capital
Risk capital
ratio
ratio
decreases
increases
−0.3757
−0.4368
(−2.58)**
(−4.01)***
0.9659
−0.1513
(3.88)***
(−1.19)
−0.1295
0.4607
(−0.48)
(2.34)**

OPINCVOL
Risk capital
Risk capital
ratio
ratio
decreases
increases
0.0011
−0.0026
(0.80)
(−1.86)*
−0.0009
−0.0009
(−1.30)
(−0.57)
−0.0032
0.0033
(−0.74)
(2.30)**

0.5902
(2.08)**

0.0065
(1.87)*

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

4,123
0.776

3,868
0.739

4,123
0.412

3,868
0.582

4,087
0.362

3,798
0.283

3,773
0.358

3,488
0.358
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Table 9
Robustness check: Changes in firm’s operating policy after the initiation of credit default swap (CDS) trading [three-stage least squares approach (3SLS)]
This table reports results on the relation among CDS inception, management compensation, and corporate investment policy using a three-stage least
squares approach (Zellner and Theil, 1962). The onset of CDS trading, vega, and corporate investment policy could be jointly determined. So, all three are
determined simultaneously with the other two endogenous variables as regressors, in addition to the control variables. We also use two exogenous variables:
Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume and Investment / Speculative Grade Frontier. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Sample consists of 5,111 nonCDS firm-years and 6,627 CDS firm-years (2,668 firm-years for pre–CDS initiation and 3,959 firm-years for post–CDS initiation). Panel A reports results of
the three-stage model with dependent variable R&D and SG&A; and Panel B, M&A and OPINCVOL. t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard
errors clustered by industry and year. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively, two-tailed in control variables and onetailed when discussing the results of hypothesis tests with predicted signs of coefficient estimates.
Panel A: 3SLS for R&D and SG&A
3SLS when RiskyInvestment = R&D
Dependent
variable
CDS_TRADE

Variable
CDS_TRADE (CDS_FIRM×POST_CDS)
CDS_FIRM

VEGA

R&D

0.0367
(2.80)***
−0.0662
(−6.35)***

−0.0019
(−3.33)***
0.0025
(5.50)***
0.0010
(2.06)**
0.0053
(3.98)***

−0.0326
(−3.84)***

VEGA
CDS_TRADE × VEGA
RiskyInvestment
Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume
Investment / Speculative Grade Frontier
Firm-level controls
Number of observations
R-squared

0.1049
(0.51)
−0.1028
(−9.22)***
0.1878
(4.64)***
Yes
11,738
0.376

0.9939
(4.70)***

Yes
11,738
0.264

Yes
11,738
0.747
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3SLS when RiskyInvestment = SG&A
Dependent
variable
VEGA
SG&A
CDS_TRADE
0.0516
(3.96)***
−0.0027
(−0.31)
−0.0484
(−4.68)***
−0.4083
(−16.13)***
−0.0768
(−6.66)***
0.3501
(8.32)***
Yes
11,738
0.377

−0.0430
(−9.28)***
0.0746
(20.05)***
−0.0167
(−4.55)***
0.0887
(8.31)***

0.7114
(27.89)***

Yes
11,738
0.265

Yes
11,738
0.416

Table 9 continued
Panel B: 3SLS for M&A and OPINCVOL

Variable
CDS_TRADE (CDS_FIRM×POST_CDS)
CDS_FIRM
VEGA
CDS_TRADE × VEGA
RiskyInvestment
Industry Peers’ Bond Trading Volume
Investment / Speculative Grade Frontier
Firm-level controls
Number of observations
R-squared

3SLS when RiskyInvestment = M&A
Dependent variable
CDS_TRADE
VEGA
M&A
0.0886
−1.0587
(6.74)***
(−34.48)***
−0.0385
−0.3309
(−3.66)***
(−13.58)***
0.0426
0.3022
(5.22)***
(11.90)***
0.4483
(6.30)***
−0.1964
0.0641
(−61.03)***
(16.91)***
−0.0879
(−8.11)***
0.1731
(4.39)***
Yes
Yes
Yes
11,738
11,738
11,738
0.398
0.265
0.163
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3SLS when RiskyInvestment = OPINCVOL
Dependent variable
CDS_TRADE
VEGA
OPINCVOL
0.0450
0.0017
(6.41)***
(2.25)**
−0.0333
−0.0015
(−5.98)***
(−2.69)***
0.0092
−0.0093
(0.60)
(−8.61)***
0.0015
(1.56)*
0.3584
−0.8006
(2.15)**
(−8.69)***
−0.0968
(−8.62)***
0.2541
(6.30)***
Yes
Yes
Yes
11,738
11,738
11,738
0.376
0.400
0.234

